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“With about one year to go before the next Nuclear Security Summit 
in Seoul in spring 2012, we are very conﬁ dent that we will be able 
to demonstrate signiﬁ cant progress toward fulﬁ lling the work plan 
agreed to in Washington.”
—Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor 
to the President, March 29, 2011
This report highlights the progress made in nuclear material security since the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) and serves as a status update halfway to the next summit in 2012.
Executive Summary
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•  A core achievement of the 2010 sum-
mit was that the 47 nations in attendance 
reached consensus that nuclear terrorism is 
among the top global security challenges and 
that strong nuclear material security mea-
sures are the most effective way to prevent it.
•  The White House released a highlights 
document last April listing 54 national com-
mitments made by 29 of the countries at 
the summit. Some countries, including the 
United States, made additional commitments 
in their national statements. However, not 
all of these statements are publicly available.
•  Important progress has been made in a 
number of areas and states are generally on 
track to meeting their key commitments 
by 2012. Based on our assessment of open 
source information, we conclude that ap-
proximately 60 percent of these national 
commitments have been completed, and 
notable progress has been made on another 
30 percent. 
•  Examples of completed national commit-
ments include:
o  Chile sent all of its highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) to the United States.
o  Kazakhstan secured enough HEU 
and plutonium to make 775 nuclear 
weapons.
o  Russia ended its plutonium produc-
tion and signed a plutonium disposition 
protocol with the United States.
•  Examples of progress made on national 
commitments include:
o  China signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the United States to 
work together on establishing a nuclear 
security Center of Excellence in China. 
o  Ukraine removed over half of its 
HEU, putting it on track to meet its 
pledge to eliminate all of its HEU by 
the 2012 summit.
•  The progress made in implementing the na-
tional commitments demonstrates the prom-
ise of the NSS process in generating concrete 
outcomes and improvements in global nuclear 
material security. The NSS process offers a 
unique vehicle with great potential for moving 
the nuclear security agenda forward.
•  However, it is important to recognize that the 
nuclear security challenge will not be solved 
once the commitments made in 2010 are com-
pleted. An objective for the next summit should 
be to gain acknowledgement that nuclear 
material security is an ongoing, long-term chal-
lenge that will require new initiatives, funding 
streams, and collaborations to confront evolv-
ing threats and prevent nuclear terrorism.
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The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), held on April 12-13 in Washington, D.C., marked an important step toward improving nuclear material security around the world. Forty-seven nations, 38 of them represented by their 
head of state or head of government, attended the summit and signed on to joint 
documents outlining goals for strengthening the global nuclear security regime. 
Countries plan to share progress on meeting these objectives at a second summit, 
planned for 2012 in the Republic of Korea. U.S. President Barack Obama, who set a 
goal for securing all vulnerable nuclear material within four years in his landmark 
April 2009 speech in Prague, has made the summit process a central part of his 
nuclear security agenda.
Introduction
While President Obama’s four year timeframe 
helped to galvanize support and bring urgency to 
this cause, this issue has a longer time-horizon. Ef-
forts to strengthen nuclear material security must 
adapt to evolving threat environments over the 
long term, and it is crucial to understand the threats 
posed by insufﬁ cient control over nuclear material. 
The prospect of nuclear terrorism is a global 
concern; a nuclear weapon detonated in any of the 
world’s major cities would have dramatic economic, 
political, and human consequences. There is cur-
rently enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
in the world to make more than 60,000 nuclear 
weapons.1 Moreover, the level of security over this 
material varies widely.
Increasing the ability of states to prevent theft 
or diversion of material is the primary goal of the 
nuclear material security regime. The NSS pro-
cess has helped to generate immediate results and 
improvements in nuclear security by focusing on 
gaining compliance with the existing structures and 
mechanisms. The summit process is valuable because 
it elevates the issue of nuclear security to a major in-
ternational priority and allows countries to monitor 
and recognize progress with open lines of dialogue.  
This report seeks to highlight the progress that 
has been made in nuclear material security and 
serve as a status update halfway between the Wash-
ington summit and the next summit in 2012. It fo-
cuses on the national commitments made last April, 
but also includes instances where signiﬁ cant prog-
ress has been made outside of these commitments. 
Although additional commitments were made in 
the April 2010 summit’s communiqué and work 
plan, their language is generally vague, and they 
do not contain clear or speciﬁ c goals that might be 
tracked with open source documents. The roughly 
60 national commitments listed in the highlights 
document and U.S. national statement, by com-
parison, are more concrete. For example, national 
commitments include speciﬁ c states promising to 
pass legislation to strengthen export control laws, 
ratify certain international agreements, and remove 
and repatriate nuclear material. 
While the nuclear security challenge will not 
be solved by the next meeting in 2012, important 
progress has been made in a number of areas and 
the states are on track to meeting their key commit-
3A
rm
s 
Co
nt
ro
l A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
an
d 
Pa
rt
ne
rs
hi
p 
fo
r G
lo
ba
l S
ec
ur
ity
ments. Eight countries have removed all or some of 
their remaining nuclear material, 13 countries have 
signed on to one of two major international agree-
ments, and four have joined the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In addition, 12 coun-
tries have made domestic improvements to their 
regulatory systems, engaged in nuclear security 
training initiatives, or hosted international confer-
ences on nuclear security issues. In doing so, these 
states reinforce the idea that the summit process’ 
very nature—repeated meetings and continued 
dialogue—can be effective in generating concrete 
actions and outcomes. 
We recognize that nuclear security improvements 
are difﬁ cult, require sustained political and ﬁ nan-
cial support from the international community, and 
are often not publicized in open sources. The extent 
to which non-governmental organizations can be 
involved in the monitoring and tracking of com-
mitments made at the ﬁ rst NSS is largely dependent 
on items reported in open sources. The information 
contained in this report is accurate and up to date 
to the best of our knowledge as of March 2011. Giv-
en that the summit process is the main mechanism 
by which the Obama administration is coordinating 
efforts to implement its nuclear security agenda, we 
hope to play a constructive role in taking stock of 
what progress has and has not been made. Our aim 
is to provide a broad audience with information 
on the status of commitments made at the 2010 
summit as well as a basis for looking forward to the 
2012 meeting.
U.S. President Barack Obama holds a press conference at the conclusion of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit 
on April 13, 2010.
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The United States and 29 other countries participating in the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) made over 60 speciﬁ c national commitments to bolster global nuclear security.  The United States’ commitments were included 
in its national statement, and those of the 29 nations were listed in a highlights document 
released by the White House.2 These national commitments include pledges consistent 
with the declarations in the NSS communiqué and work plan and others that go beyond 
the summit’s consensus outcomes. While over 50 non-binding commitments were agreed 
to by all 47 summit participants in the work plan, most are caveated and require nations to 
fulﬁ ll them “as appropriate,” when “technically and economically feasible,” and “as soon 
as possible.” Communiqué and work plan commitments are not tracked here.3
National Commitments 
by Category
Specific commitments made in the U.S. national 
statement and the highlights document have been 
tracked and categorized in this section of the report 
as follows:
•  International Conventions
•  Removing and Securing HEU
•  Reactor Conversions or Shut Downs
•  New IAEA Cooperation
•  New Centers, Conference, and Training 
Activities
•  New National Laws
•  Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
•  Preventing Nuclear Smuggling
•  G-8 Global Partnership
To see the commitments organized by country, see 
“National Commitments by Country.”
International Conventions
The communiqué and work plan recognize the im-
portance of the International Convention on the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material (CPPNM), and the CPPNM’s 2005 Amend-
ment as legally-binding, multilateral mechanisms for 
enhancing material security and preventing nuclear 
terrorism. Summit participants called for their univer-
sal adoption, as even a number of countries attending 
the summit had not yet ratiﬁ ed them (see country 
proﬁ les for details).    
Results
In line with their national commitments, Armenia, 
Georgia, and the United Kingdom have ratiﬁ ed 
the nuclear terrorism convention.4 Germany and 
the United Kingdom ratiﬁ ed the CPPNM’s 2005 
Amendment, and France recently conﬁ rmed that it 
is still working to ratify the 2005 Amendment.5   
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Though Argentina committed to moving toward 
the ratiﬁ cation of ICSANT and the 2005 CPPNM 
Amendment, its progress in doing either is not clear. 
Similarly, Australia committed to move toward 
ratifying the nuclear terrorism convention, but any 
progress in doing so has not been publicly reported.  
The United States also pledged to accelerate 
its ratiﬁ cation of ICSANT and the 2005 CPPNM 
Amendment. According to the United States’ NSS 
national statement, legislation that would update 
U.S. law to comply with the treaties has been sub-
mitted to Congress, and ratiﬁ cation instruments 
will be submitted after the new laws are in place. 
Neither convention has been ratiﬁ ed yet.  
Removing and Securing HEU
Summit documents recognize that the use and 
management of nuclear materials and facilities 
are under the jurisdiction of individual states 
but encourage steps to keep them secure, includ-
ing consolidating national sites where material 
is stored and removing and disposing of mate-
rials no longer in use. In this vein, a number 
of participants made national commitments to 
consolidate, secure, or remove highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) in their territory, and notable 
progress has been achieved.   
Chile, Mexico, and Ukraine committed to a full 
clean out of their HEU stocks. Kazakhstan pledged 
to cooperatively work on BN-350 reactor shut-
down and fuel security as well as the elimination 
of HEU from a reactor that will undergo conver-
sion. Canada committed to funding HEU removal 
activities in Mexico and Vietnam. Canada will 
also return HEU spent fuel to the United States. 
Additionally, the United States pledged to convert 
its six remaining HEU-fueled research reactors.
Results
In February 2010, Chile collaborated with the 
U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) to remove all HEU from the country.6 The 
removal operation included approximately 13 
kilograms (kg) of HEU from the La Reina Nuclear 
Center, 4 kg of slightly irradiated HEU and less 
than 1 kg of fresh fuel from Lo Aguirre Nuclear 
The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced the removal of 73.6 kg of Russian-origin HEU spent 
fuel from Kazakhstan in May 2009.
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Center, and more than 400 radiological sources.  
Ukraine committed to give up all of its HEU 
by the 2012 NSS, and half by the end of 2010. 
On December 31, 2010, NNSA announced that 
it had worked with Ukrainian, Russian, British, 
and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
authorities to remove 50 kg of HEU fresh fuel 
from three sites in Ukraine, including Sevastopol 
National University of Nuclear Industry and En-
ergy.7 The material was returned to Russia, and 
NNSA provided low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 
replace the HEU that had been removed from the 
Kiev Institute for Nuclear Research and Kharkiv 
Institute for Physics and Technology. Earlier in 
the year, NNSA and Ukraine worked together to 
return another 56 kg of HEU spent fuel to Russia. 
These removals have placed the country on track 
to meet its 2012 goal.  
Kazakhstan has also been working with NNSA 
to secure its HEU, including by completing the 
transport of spent fuel from its BN-350 reactor fa-
cility to a new storage facility in eastern Kazakh-
stan in November 2010.8 The spent fuel, which 
was packaged and transported in specially de-
signed dual-use transportation and storage casks, 
will remain under IAEA safeguards at this new 
secure facility.  
On the final day of the NSS, Mexico announced 
that it would eliminate all HEU from its terri-
tory.  According to a trilateral agreement, it will 
work with the United States and Canada under 
the auspices of the IAEA to convert its HEU-fueled 
research reactor to use LEU.9  Negotiations among 
the countries have been initiated.10 In support of 
this agreement, Canada made a national com-
mitment to fund Mexico’s removal efforts, as well 
as another planned HEU removal operation in 
Vietnam. Vietnam signed a memorandum of un-
derstanding with the United States in December 
2010 reaffirming its pledge to remove HEU fuel 
from its Dalat research reactor.11  
Canada also committed to returning a large 
amount of HEU spent fuel to the United States 
that was used to produce medical isotopes. The 
project to return material that is currently stored 
at Chalk River Laboratories in Ontario is scheduled 
to occur between 2010 and 2018.12 The United 
States completed the conversion of all 20 HEU-fu-
eled research reactors that are able to be converted 
to use existing LEU-fuel in 2009.13 However, there 
are six more HEU-fueled research reactors in the 
country that have not been converted because al-
ternative fuel has yet to be developed.  
The 2010 NSS has also spurred at least one 
country outside of the summit process to commit 
to fully eliminate its stocks of HEU. Less than a 
year after Belarusian President Alexander Lu-
kashenko rejected the notion of returning all of 
his country’s HEU to Russia, Belarusian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Martynov announced in a Decem-
ber 1, 2010 joint statement with U.S. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton that Belarus would give up 
its entire stocks prior to the 2012 NSS. 14 Reports 
indicate that classified operations by NNSA in 
October and November 2010 removed over 84 kg 
of weapons-grade uranium from a research facil-
ity in Sosny, prior to committing to a full clean 
out. While Belarus was not invited to the 2010 
NSS, experts speculate that it is leveraging the 
HEU removal to gain a seat at the table in 2012.15
The Republic of Korea (ROK), which is hosting 
the 2012 summit, has tentatively agreed to invite 
Belarus if the clean out occurs.16  However, U.S. 
National Security Council staff has indicated that 
plans to remove all of Belarus’ HEU by the 2012 
summit are at risk.17 This is due to federal bud-
get battles in the U.S. Congress that have frozen 
the budgets for critical nuclear security programs 
within NNSA at the fiscal year (FY) 2010 level, 
which does not include funding for new opportu-
nities such as the Belarus clean out.  
Additionally, other significant material remov-
als have occurred independent of countries’ 
publicized national summit commitments. For 
instance, Poland, a NSS participant, completed 
the removal of over 450 kg of Russian-origin 
HEU spent fuel in October 2010 in collaboration 
with NNSA.18 Overall, since President Obama an-
nounced a four year, international effort to secure 
vulnerable nuclear materials in his April 5, 2009 
speech in Prague, NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative (GTRI) has removed all of the HEU from 
six countries: Serbia, Chile, Romania, Libya, Tai-
wan, and Turkey.19
Reactor Conversions or Shut Downs
Summit participants encouraged the conversion of 
HEU-fueled reactors to LEU in the communiqué and 
work plan as part of efforts to minimize the use of 
HEU. They recognized that the HEU used in these re-
actors, even for civilian purposes, carried higher risks 
than other nuclear materials. They also agreed to shut 
down reactors that were no longer required. In the 
spirit of this summit commitment, Russia, Kazakh-
stan, Mexico, Vietnam, and the United States pledged 
to shut down or convert reactors that use or produce 
weapons-usable materials.   
Results
Russia’s ADE-2 plutonium production reactor in 
Zheleznogorsk was shut down on April 15, 2010 in 
fulﬁ llment of the country’s national commitment 
to end plutonium production.20  This reactor had 
once produced plutonium for the Soviet Union’s 
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nuclear weapons program, but its main purpose 
since 1995 had been supplying heat for the city 
with the plutonium produced as a byproduct of its 
operation.21 The Zheleznogorsk ADE-2 reactor was 
the last of three Soviet-era reactors that the United 
States and Russia have worked together to close.  
Additionally, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey 
Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
signed the Plutonium Disposition Protocol on April 
12, 2010, fulﬁ lling another of their countries’ na-
tional pledges.22 The signing enables both countries 
to move forward in implementing the September 
2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition 
Agreement which commits each country to elimi-
nate 34 metric tons of excess military plutonium.23
A memorandum of understanding was signed on 
December 8, 2010 by the United States and Viet-
nam in which Vietnam reafﬁ rmed its 2010 NSS na-
tional commitment to convert its HEU-fueled Dalat 
research reactor to LEU fuel.24 NNSA had previously 
worked with Vietnam to partially convert the reac-
tor in September 2007, but this new agreement es-
tablishes the legal framework for its full conversion 
and the return of its spent fuel to Russia. 
Kazakhstan committed to convert a HEU research 
reactor and eliminate the remaining HEU fuel. 
Sources indicate that the Institute of Nuclear Physics’ 
research reactor in Alatau is the intended target and 
that Kazakhstan is talking with Russia and the Unit-
ed States about its conversion.25 However, no conver-
sion timeline has been made public. Kazakhstan con-
tinues to make progress on securing and eliminating 
its HEU, as detailed in the previous section.   
Mexico also committed to convert its research 
reactor, and made a trilateral announcement with 
the United States and Canada on working collab-
oratively to complete the conversion on April 13, 
2010.26 The conversion will be completed under the 
auspices of the IAEA. Negotiations have been initi-
ated to determine the terms of the conversion.27  
Finally, the United States also noted in its NSS 
national statement that it is in the “final stages 
of approval to bring up to 100 kg of plutonium 
from sites of concern into the United States 
pending disposition.”28
New IAEA Cooperation
The essential role that the IAEA plays in advanc-
ing nuclear security was highlighted in the 2010 
summit documents. The work plan detailed the 
valuable services, including the International 
Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), and 
guidance documents, including the Nuclear Se-
curity Series, that the agency offers. NSS partici-
pants were encouraged to take advantage of these 
resources and also to provide support to the IAEA 
and member states’ nuclear security efforts.  Bel-
gium, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Russia, and 
the United Kingdom made national commitments 
to provide additional funding to the IAEA’s Nu-
clear Security Fund (NSF).  France, Finland, and 
the United Kingdom announced their intentions 
to invite an IPPAS security review.  
Belgium committed to provide the NSF with 
$300,000, and Norway committed to contribute 
$3.3 million to the NSF over four years for use 
in developing countries. The United Kingdom 
committed to provide $6 million to the NSF, but 
it did not specify the timeframe. Japan, New Zea-
land, and Russia did not specify dollar amounts 
or timeframes in their national commitments to 
contribute to the NSF. 
Results
A December 5, 2010 announcement revealed that 
Russia had signed an agreement with the IAEA 
to contribute $6.5 million to the NSF between 
2010 and 2015.29  On March 8, 2011, the IAEA 
announced that it had signed an agreement with 
the United Kingdom for a £4 million (approxi-
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov sign a plutonium disposition 
protocol at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit on 
April 13, 2010.
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mately $6.4 million) contribution to the NSF.30  
The top contributors to the NSF are the United 
States, the European Union, the United King-
dom, and Canada.  
The IAEA’s “Nuclear Security Report 2010” notes 
that as of June 30, 2010, new pledges or contribu-
tions to the NSF had been made or announced 
by Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom (as 
well as Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
the ROK, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United States).31 Belgium and New Zealand have 
also made contributions.32  
The Nuclear Security Report also indicates that 
the United Kingdom requested an IPPAS mission 
to their Sellafield Nuclear Reprocessing Facility, 
and France and the United States announced 
their intentions to request IPPAS missions.33 Fin-
land received an IPPAS mission in June 2009 and 
is implementing its recommendations.34 A fol-
low-up mission is planned for 2012.35
Additionally, the United States noted in its 
NSS national statement that it had led the efforts 
in 2009 to create a dedicated line item for nucle-
ar security in the IAEA’s regular budget. Before 
this, the agency’s nuclear security work had been 
almost entirely funded with voluntary contribu-
tions from member states. Since 2007, the Unit-
ed States’ voluntary contribution to IAEA nuclear 
security activities has risen nearly 60 percent.36
New Centers, Conferences, and 
Training Activities
Summit documents emphasized the importance 
of the human dimension of nuclear security, and 
countries responded with a series of national 
commitments to enhance nuclear security cul-
ture and build human capacity through hosting 
or establishing new training and educational 
centers, conferences, and activities. 
The United States pledged to continue to sup-
port the work of the World Institute for Nuclear 
Security (WINS), and Canada and Japan com-
mitted to fund and host nuclear security best 
practices workshops with WINS. Japan said it 
would launch an integrated regional support 
center and conduct research and development 
on nuclear detection and forensic techniques. 
China announced that it would be opening a 
nuclear security Center of Excellence, and India 
announced that it would establish a Nuclear En-
ergy Center with a nuclear security component. 
Kazakhstan said it would consider hosting an 
International Nuclear Security Training Center 
and committed to hosting a Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) activity. The 
ROK also committed to host a GICNT activity.  
Italy committed to establish a school of nuclear 
security in Trieste, and France said it would 
incorporate nuclear security training into the 
curriculum of the European Nuclear Safety Train-
ing and Tutoring Institute (ENSTTI) and Inter-
national Nuclear Energy Institute.  Saudi Arabia 
pledged to host a United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 conference for the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). And perhaps 
most notably, the Republic of Korea announced 
that it would be hosting the 2012 Nuclear Secu-
rity Summit.  
Results
U.S. support for the activities of WINS began 
with an initial pledge of $3 million in 2009 and 
continues with a new award from the Depart-
ment of State for $900,000 over two years.37  Ac-
cording to WINS’ 2010 Annual Report, the U.S. 
Department of Energy provided €1,112,942 to 
the organization last year.38 A WINS workshop 
on “Guard Force Recruitment, Training, Deploy-
ment, and Exercises” took place in Ontario, Can-
ada in June 2010. Another WINS workshop on 
“Corporate Governance and Security Leadership” 
took place in Tokyo, Japan in September 2010.39  
Japan’s new Integrated Comprehensive Sup-
port Center for Non-proliferation and Nuclear 
Security for Asia opened at the Japan Atomic 
Energy Agency (JAEA) facility in Tokai-muria on 
February 4, 2011.40 The center will be operated 
by JAEA and offer lectures, seminars, hands-on 
training courses, and e-learning opportunities.41
In support of the center and related efforts, the 
United States and Japan established a bilateral 
Nuclear Security Working Group in November 
2010 to help facilitate cooperation and tan-
gible outcomes for the 2012 NSS.42 This interac-
tion supports the international effort that the 
United States has launched to develop a nuclear 
forensics library, common lexicon, and other 
foundational elements of nuclear forensic coop-
eration.43 Additionally, Japan hosted an “Inter-
national Workshop on Nuclear Forensics Follow-
ing on the Nuclear Security Summit” in October 
2010 in Tokai as part of its efforts to advance 
research and development on nuclear detection 
and forensics.44  
China and the United States announced the 
signing of a memorandum of understanding on 
January 19, 2011 that paves the way for NNSA 
to work with China’s Atomic Energy Authority 
on a Center of Excellence in China that will pro-
mote effective nuclear security and safeguards 
throughout Asia.45 NNSA will provide some 
equipment to the center and help develop train-
ing programs and best practice exchanges.46 It is 
not clear when the center will open. This center 
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in China is a part of the United States’ broader 
effort to create new Centers of Excellence in Nu-
clear Security in countries outside of the former 
Soviet Union (FSU). As part of an overall request-
ed budget increase for international weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) security programs in FY 
2011, the Obama administration requested $30 
million to establish these centers under the De-
partment of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduc-
tion program.47  
A press release from India’s Press Information 
Bureau in August 2010 indicated that India’s 
Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership 
would be owned and operated by the govern-
ment, but open to international participation.48
A “phased approach” for setting up the center 
will be pursued, and India’s Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC) chairman explained that the 
center will consist of four different schools dedi-
cated to topics that include nuclear security, nu-
clear energy systems, and radiation safety.49 Over 
200 acres of land in Bahadurgarh, Haryana is be-
ing purchased by AEC for the center’s campus.50
Additionally, a November 2010 Joint Statement 
by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh 
acknowledged a memorandum of understanding 
between the two countries for cooperating on 
the center.51   
Kazakhstan fulfilled its pledge to host a GICNT 
activity by co-hosting an “Exercise on Counter-
ing the Financing of Nuclear Terrorism” in Sep-
tember 2010 and the “Inaugural Implementation 
and Assessment Group (IAG) Meeting” in October 
2010.52 No new information about Kazakhstan’s 
plans to consider hosting an International Nucle-
ar Security Training Center is available.53
The Republic of Korea hosted GICNT’s “Work-
shop on Detecting and Responding to Illicit 
Transport and Trafficking of Nuclear and Radio-
active Materials” and the “3rd Exercising Plan-
ning Group Meeting” in April 2009. The ROK 
will also host the group’s next Plenary meeting 
in Seoul in 2011.54  
On November 8, 2010, the Nuclear Energy 
Management School was opened at the Inter-
national Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) 
in Trieste, Italy.55 The school, a collaboration 
between ICTP and the IAEA, will provide special-
ized management training to young profession-
als from developing countries.  
In March 2010, France’s President Nicolas Sar-
kozy announced that his country would create 
an International Nuclear Energy Institute that 
would interact with the budding array of nuclear 
centers of excellence being established around 
the world and expand training opportunities 
for nuclear professionals.56 At the 2010 summit 
France made a commitment to incorporate nu-
clear security into this Institute and reaffirmed 
it in January 2011.57 France also committed to 
incorporating nuclear security training into EN-
STTI’s curriculum.  The school’s 2011 curriculum 
now includes this training as part of its “Induc-
tion to Nuclear Safety” program.58  
Saudi Arabia satisfied its commitment to host 
a UNSCR 1540 conference for the GCC on De-
cember 11-12, 2010.59 The regional workshop 
took place in Riyadh and focused on implement-
ing UNSCR 1540 to prevent terrorist acquisition 
of WMDs.  Additionally, in February 2011, NNSA 
and the Department of State announced that a 
new Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute 
(GNEII) would be created within the Khalifa 
University of Science, Technology, and Research 
in Abu Dhabi.60 GNEII will provide classroom in-
struction and hands on training in nuclear ener-
gy security, safeguards, and safety infrastructure. 
Currently, GNEII is only open to three nuclear-
related GCC organizations, but it will expand to 
accommodate all six in 2012.  
Preparation is underway for the 2012 NSS to be 
hosted by the Republic of Korea. An inter-minis-
French President Nicolas Sarkozy delivers a speech 
at the International Conference on Access to Civilian 
Nuclear Energy in Paris, France on March 8, 2010.
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terial preparatory committee headed by the prime 
minister has been convened which will oversee 
the general planning, management, protocol, and 
public relations aspects of the 2012 summit.61
The event’s agenda and participants list is under 
development in consultation with the representa-
tives from other countries—“sherpas” and “sous 
sherpas.” The scope of the summit is expected 
to include an evaluation of commitment imple-
mentation from the 2010 summit and may also 
be broadened to include a greater emphasis on ra-
diological material security and other topics like 
information technology security. Side events with 
civil society and the nuclear industry will likely 
be held on the margins of the summit, similar to 
what took place around the Washington summit. 
Additionally, the ROK announced in September 
2010 that it will open an International Nuclear 
Security Training Center in 2014.62 Though it 
was not among their national commitments, the 
center is intended to support the ROK’s plans to 
spread the benefits of nuclear energy while miti-
gating the risks of its misuse.  
Regional meetings have taken place to support 
the summit process and include countries beyond 
those present at the 2010 NSS, including one 
in Warsaw, Poland on August 30, 2010 and one 
planned for Chile in spring 2011.63 Also, a sherpa 
meeting took place in Buenos Aires, Argentina on 
November 2, 2010 and another occurred in Vienna, 
Austria in March 2011.64       
New National Laws
Given that it is primarily the responsibility of 
states to ensure that the nuclear material on 
their territory is protected, summit documents 
encouraged participants to maintain and enforce 
effective national laws and regulations to keep 
materials secure and criminalize any misuse or 
misconduct. In advance of the 2010 summit, Ar-
menia, Egypt, and Malaysia passed new export 
controls laws and regulations to govern their 
nuclear activities. 
Results
Egypt enacted a law in March 2010 on “Regu-
lating Nuclear and Radiological Activities” that 
confirms the country’s adherence to all inter-
national, regional, and bilateral treaties and 
agreements that Egypt has ratified.65 The law 
was passed as part of preparation to achieve the 
country’s goal of building four nuclear reactors 
by 2025.66
In April 2010, Malaysia passed the “Strategic 
Trade Bill 2010” which includes new export 
controls and authorizes state action against 
anyone involved with designing, developing, 
or producing WMDs.  
Armenia passed new export control laws 
beginning in November 2009. The legislation 
updated the country’s export control laws and 
regulations to comply with international stan-
dards and was accomplished over a period of ap-
proximately 15 months.67    
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism (GICNT)
The value of the GICNT in promoting nuclear se-
curity was recognized in summit documents, and 
participants were encouraged to work together and 
expand cooperation under this and other multilat-
eral initiatives that support improved nuclear secu-
rity. Since its creation in 2006, GICNT has grown 
to include 82 countries and four official observers 
who voluntarily commit to implementing a set of 
nuclear security goals articulated in the group’s 
Statement of Principles.68  
Results
Argentina, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet-
nam all made national commitments to join the 
initiative. All four countries, plus Mexico and Sin-
gapore, were welcomed as new members of GICNT 
at its June 2010 Plenary Meeting.69   
In its NSS national statement, the United States
reiterated its April 2009 pledge to turn GICNT 
into a “durable international institution.”  Ideas 
under consideration by the GICNT for achieving 
this goal, which the group has termed “enhanc-
ing implementation,” include “clearly identifying 
a policy making body, having a decision making 
mechanism that is open to all partners, better 
coordinating exercise planning, and…facilitating 
capacity building.”70  At the 2010 GICNT plenary 
meeting, five accomplishments aimed at “enhanc-
ing implementation” were highlighted: 1) adopting 
a revised Terms of Reference to define participant 
roles, responsibilities, and implementation mecha-
nisms, 2) endorsing the continuation of the United 
States and Russia as the group’s co-chairs, 3) agree-
ing to activate the Implementation and Assessment 
Group (IAG) to provide strategic oversight, 4) se-
lecting Spain as the first IAG Coordinator, and 5) 
identifying nuclear detection and nuclear forensics 
as priority issue areas for 2011.71
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling
Summit documents emphasized the need for states 
to work together to prevent and respond to inci-
dents of nuclear smuggling. One mechanism that 
supports this objective is the United States’ Mega-
ports Initiative. It is part of the United States’ Sec-
ond Line of Defense (SLD) program within NNSA 
that provides equipment, training, and technical 
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support to partner countries to help prevent nucle-
ar and radioactive material smuggling at maritime 
ports. Another mechanism is the United States’ 
Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI). 
NSOI engages with countries to create Joint Action 
Plans to improve anti-smuggling capabilities and 
facilitate donor partnerships that fortify human 
and capital resources to prevent nuclear smuggling. 
The GICNT also offers resources and expertise to 
help its members bolster capacity to counter nu-
clear smuggling. Additionally, UNSCR 1540, unani-
mously passed in 2004, requires UN member states 
to enforce measures to prevent WMD proliferation. 
The United States has proposed a voluntary fund to 
help countries meet this obligation.  
Italy and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) both 
listed their recently signing Megaports agreements 
with the United States as national commitments 
at the 2010 NSS. New Zealand committed to con-
tributing to NSOI, and Norway pledged $500,000 
in additional resources to support GICNT efforts to 
upgrade radiation portal monitors in Kazakhstan. 
The United States pledged to contribute to the UN-
SCR 1540 voluntary fund that it proposed.
Results 
The United Arab Emirates signed its agreement 
with the United States in December 2009 to be-
gin cooperative efforts to install radiation detec-
tion equipment and infrastructure at the ports 
of Abu Dhabi and Sharjah.72 This agreement was 
signed in Abu Dhabi, and it builds on a Mega-
ports agreement signed with Dubai in 2005.73
Italy signed its agreement in March 2010 un-
der which NNSA will work with the Customs 
Agency of the Italian Republic to deter, detect, 
and interdict nuclear trafficking at several Ital-
ian ports, including Genoa and Gioia Tauro.74
The agreement will enable NNSA to provide 
equipment and training for the ports and in-
cludes cost-sharing arrangements.75  
Under NSOI, New Zealand provided radiologi-
cal monitoring equipment for the Boryspol Inter-
national Airport in Kyiv, Ukraine in 2010.76 Fund-
ing for this project, as well as two earlier ones 
in 2007 and 2009, was provided under NSOI and 
implemented by the U.S. SLD program.77  
In December 2010, Norway’s $500,000 contri-
bution to upgrading portal monitors in Kazakh-
stan through the GICNT was announced.78 The 
funding under GICNT will be used by the U.S. 
SLD program on radiation detection equipment 
at the Almaty airport.79  
In its FY 2011 budget request, the United 
States included $3 million for the proposed UN-
SCR 1540 implementation fund, but Congress 
had not appropriated this funding at the time 
of this report. For FY 2012, the Obama admin-
istration has requested $1.5 million for the vol-
untary fund.  Additionally, the United States is 
11
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Vietnam’s Vice Minister of Finance Do Hoang Anh Tuan and U.S. Ambassador Michael Michalak sign a Megaports 
Agreement on July 2, 2010.
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working to develop new neutron detection tech-
nologies.  According to the U.S. NSS national 
statement, the development timeframe for these 
new detectors has been shortened from five 
years to 18 months.80  
G-8 Global Partnership
The role and contributions of the G-8 Global Part-
nership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materi-
als of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) were 
recognized in summit documents. The work plan 
welcomed additional programming to enhance nu-
clear material security by partners in this multilat-
eral initiative. The Global Partnership was created 
in 2002 by the G-8 to provide $20 billion over ten 
years for WMD safety, security, and nonprolifera-
tion projects in Russia and the FSU.  It currently 
has 15 partners outside of the G-8. The Global 
Partnership’s geographic mandate was broadened 
in 2008, but operationally, its work continues to be 
focused in the FSU.  
With the Global Partnership set to expire in 
2012, Canada pledged to champion its exten-
sion.  U.S. President Obama expressed his sup-
port for a 10 year extension and mission expan-
sion of the Global Partnership at the 2010 NSS 
and committed another $10 billion in funding 
for new projects.81
Results
At the June 2010 G-8 summit in Muskoka, Canada, 
the United States supported Canada’s efforts to 
extend and expand the initiative. However, the G-
8 only agreed for an expert group to examine the 
initiative’s future.82 Canadian officials are work-
ing to build support for the initiative through 
diplomatic channels and public outreach events.83
One such event took place on March 11, 2011 at 
the Canadian embassy in Washington D.C., titled 
“Global Efforts in WMD Threat Reduction: Per-
spectives on the Nuclear Security Summit and G-8 
Global Partnership.”84
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This section of the report provides brief profiles of the 47 nations that attended the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), as well as Belarus (for reasons explained in the Belarusian profile). The profiles list the status 
of the national commitments made in Washington, the states’ membership in the 
relevant international conventions, and their fissile material holdings. The profiles 
also contain brief notes about why certain countries are relevant to the broader 
nuclear security agenda. The purpose is not to single countries out for criticism, but 
rather to provide readers with context for understanding the commitments.
National Commitments 
by Country
The profiles cover the major commitments made 
at the 2010 NSS, as outlined in the White House 
document “Highlights of the National Commit-
ments made at the Nuclear Security Summit” and 
the American national statement. 
As the profiles demonstrate, roughly 60 percent 
of the commitments made in 2010 have already 
been met, and notable progress has been made on 
another 30 percent. Very few commitments have 
seen no progress at all. In short, countries are do-
ing what they committed to do in Washington and 
are generally on track to complete these commit-
ments by 2012. This is not to say that the world’s 
nuclear security problems are on the cusp of be-
ing solved – far from it. There will still be much 
left to do even if every one of the commitments is 
completed. Hopefully, these findings can serve a 
useful function in terms of laying out the signifi-
cant progress that has been made in the past year 
and pointing towards what is left to be done in the 
lead-up to the Seoul summit and beyond.
Notes and Sources:
National commitments made in 2010 are from: 
“Highlights of the National Commitments made 
at the Nuclear Security Summit,” The White 
House, April 13, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/highlights-national-
commitments-made-nss
All information on fissile material holdings 
is from one of the following two sources unless 
otherwise noted: 
•  International Panel on Fissile Materials, 
“Global Fissile Materials Report 2010: Balancing 
the Books: Production and Stocks,” December 
2010, http://www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr10.pdf. 
•  “Highly Enriched Uranium: Who Has 
What?,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, April 22, 
2010, http://www.nti.org/db/heu/Heu_Who_
Has_What.pdf.
Unless otherwise noted, all information on nuclear 
weapons stockpiles is from: “Status of World Nuclear 
Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, February 
19, 2011, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/
nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html.
All data for membership in the Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
(CPPNM) is from: “Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material,” International 
Atomic Energy Agency, January 11, 2011, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Conventions/cppnm_status.pdf. 
All data for the 2005 amendment to 
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By Robert Golan-Vilella
the CPPNM is from: “Amendment to the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material,” International Atomic Energy 
Agency, March 29, 2011, http://www.iaea.org/
Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_
amend_status.pdf. 
All data for the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) 
is from: “15. International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,” United 
Nations Treaty Collection, April 1, 2011, http://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=UN
TSONLINE&mtdsg_no=XVIII~15&chapter=18&Tem
p=mtdsg3&lang=en#Participants. 
All information on membership in the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is 
from: “Partner Nations List,” U.S. Department of 
State, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c37083.htm.
In the fall of 2010, the Fissile Materials Working 
Group (FMWG) sent out a questionnaire to 
the embassies and foreign ministries of the 47 
countries attending the Washington summit. The 
survey asked questions regarding nuclear security 
in each of the countries and the actions that they 
had taken toward meeting the commitments they 
made in Washington. Some of their responses have 
been incorporated into this report.
Throughout this section, tons refer to metric tons.
Algeria
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: State Party (acceded March 2011) 
Fissile Material Holdings
None
Argentina
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism (GICNT)
•  Status: COMPLETED 
2. Moving toward the ratiﬁ cation of ICSANT
•  Status: Unclear / No progress evident
3. Moving toward the ratiﬁ cation of the CPPNM 
2005 Amendment
•  Status: Unclear / No progress evident
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT:  Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 1-10 kilograms (kg). Argentina’s stocks are “in 
the ﬁ nal stages of cleanout.”85
Armenia
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Ratiﬁ ed International Convention on Suppression 
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
•  Status: COMPLETED (ratiﬁ ed September 2010)
2. Passed new export control law
•  Status: COMPLETED86
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: State Party 
Fissile Material Holdings
None
Australia
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Moving toward the ratiﬁ cation of ICSANT 
•  Status: Unclear / No progress evident
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 1-10 kg. Australia’s stocks are “in the ﬁ nal 
stages of cleanout.”87
Belarus
National Commitments Made at NSS
None (did not attend summit)
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 85-285 kg (see below)
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Notes
Prior to 2010, Belarus was estimated to have 170-
370 kg of HEU. Belarus was not invited to attend 
the Washington summit. At the time, its president 
Alexander Lukashenko declared that his country 
would never give up its HEU. Nevertheless, in late 
2010 the United States helped remove 85 kg of 
HEU from Belarus in two secret operations, and in 
December 2010 Belarus pledged to eliminate all of 
its stocks of HEU by the time of the 2012 Nuclear 
Security Summit.88 As a result, South Korea “has 
agreed to invite Belarus” to the next summit, 
“contingent upon the completion of its highly 
enriched uranium removal.”89
Belgium
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Contributing $300,000 to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund 
•  Status: COMPLETED90
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 700-750 kg 
Notes
In addition to its HEU stocks, Belgium hosts an 
estimated 10-20 American tactical nuclear weapons 
at Kleine Brogel Air Base.91
Brazil
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kg 
Canada
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Returning a large amount of spent HEU fuel 
from its medical isotope production reactor to the 
United States 
•  Status: In progress. The fuel is 
scheduled to be repatriated to the United 
States “between 2010 and 2018.”92
2. Championing the extension of the G-8 Global 
Partnership
•  Status: In progress. Canada has 
advocated for the Global Partnership’s 
extension, but it has so far not occurred. 
The Global Partnership will expire in 
2012 if it is not extended.
3. Funding highly enriched uranium removals from 
Mexico and Vietnam 
•  Status: In progress. Canada pledged 
to provide $8 million in funding to the 
U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
to support the two projects.93 A trilateral 
agreement between the United States, 
Mexico, and Canada was reached 
concerning the Mexican removals.94
4. Hosting and funding a World Institute of Nuclear 
Security best practices workshop
•  Status: COMPLETED (hosted June 
2010)95
5. Unveiling $100 million in new bilateral security 
cooperation with Russia 
•  Status: Unclear / no progress evident
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: About 1,350 kg
Notes
Canada is the world’s leading producer of the 
medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), which is 
widely used in treating cancer, heart disease, and 
brain disorders.96 Canada produces this isotope at 
its National Research Universal (NRU) reactor in 
Chalk River, which uses HEU targets.97 The NRU’s 
operating license is currently set to expire in 2016; it 
is unclear how Canada will proceed after this date.
Chile
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Removed all HEU (18 kg) in March 2010
•  Status: COMPLETED98
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
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CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: State Party (ratiﬁ ed September 2010)
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kg
China
National Commitments Made at NSS
1.  Announce cooperation on a nuclear security 
Center of Excellence  
•  Status: In progress. China and the 
United States signed a memorandum 
of understanding on the creation of the 
center in January 2011.99
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: State Party (ratiﬁ ed November 2010)
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 16 ± 4 tons
Plutonium: 1.8 ± 0.5 tons
Notes
Little is officially known about the status of 
China’s nuclear weapons and fissile material 
stockpiles, which Beijing has never disclosed. 
China is estimated to possess approximately 
240 nuclear warheads. China is thought to have 
stopped producing fissile materials for weapons 
around 1990, but has never formally made a 
declaration to this effect.100 Beijing’s current 
stocks of fissile materials are believed to be 
entirely devoted to military activities; this may 
change in the upcoming years if China goes 
ahead with plans to develop a commercial-scale 
reprocessing plant.101
Czech Republic
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party (accepted 
December 2010)
ICSANT: State Party 
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 10-100 kg. The Czech Republic’s stocks 
are “on track to be cleaned out in the next few 
years.”102
Egypt
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Passed new comprehensive nuclear law in March 
2010 that includes nuclear security, criminalization 
of sabotage and illicit trafﬁ cking provisions as well 
as envisaging an independent regulatory authority 
•  Status: COMPLETED103
International Instruments
CPPNM: No action
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory 
Fissile Material Holdings
None
Finland
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Invited an International Physical Protection 
Advisory Service (IPPAS) security review from 
the IAEA
•  Status: COMPLETED (review 
completed in June 2009)104
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: State Party 
Fissile Material Holdings
None
France
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Ratifying the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM
•  Status: In progress. According to the 
French government, “We are currently 
amending our national legislation in order 
to be able to ratify … the amendment to 
the Convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material.”105
2. Inviting an IPPAS security review from the IAEA
•  Status: In progress. “France will 
soon request the IAEA to conduct 
an International Physical Protection 
Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission to 
assess its system.”106
3. Incorporating training in nuclear security at the 
European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring 
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Institute and the International Nuclear Energy 
Institute
•  Status: In progress. France’s ENSTTI 
summer 2011 training program is 
scheduled to include courses on 
“Nuclear security and non-proliferation 
objectives.”107
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 30.9 ± 6 tons
Plutonium: 61.9 ± 1 tons
Notes
France has an arsenal of approximately 300 nuclear 
warheads and extensive civilian stockpiles of ﬁ ssile 
materials. France possesses 55.9 tons of plutonium 
and 4.9 tons of HEU as of its most recent declaration 
of civilian stocks.108 In addition, roughly 26 tons of 
foreign-owned plutonium, principally owned by 
Japan, is stored on French territory. France is also 
one of the few countries to continue reprocessing 
spent nuclear fuel.
Georgia
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Signed instrument of approval for ICSANT
•  Status: COMPLETED (acceded April 2010)
International Instruments
CPPNM:  State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT:  State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kg 
Germany
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Moving toward ratifying the 2005 Amendment of 
the CPPNM
•  Status: COMPLETED (ratified 
October 2010)
International Instruments
CPPNM:  State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: About 920 kg 
Plutonium: 9.5 tons (7.5 tons stored outside country)
Notes
Germany’s HEU stockpiles are predicted to increase in 
the coming years and cross the 1,000 kg threshold. This 
is due to the operation of its FRM-II research reactor 
in Bavaria. Should the reactor continue functioning, 
Germany “could become the last non-weapon state 
with a HEU-fueled reactor.”109 The United States is also 
believed to store 10-20 nuclear weapons in Germany.110
India
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Announcing the creation of a Nuclear Energy 
Center with a nuclear security component
•  Status: In progress. A memorandum 
of understanding was signed with the 
United States in November 2010.111
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 1.3 ± 0.5 tons
Plutonium: 4 ± 0.65 tons
Notes
India is one of the few countries today that continues 
to produce both HEU and plutonium. India’s production 
of HEU is chieﬂ y intended to fuel its nuclear submarine 
propulsion program, which is believed to be working 
toward a ﬂ eet of three to ﬁ ve nuclear submarines.112 Its 
nuclear weapons arsenal, believed to contain roughly 
80-100 warheads, is based on plutonium. It is estimated 
that 0.5 tons of its plutonium stockpile are weapons-
grade, while the remaining 3.5 tons are reactor-grade.113
Indonesia
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party (ratiﬁ ed May 
2010)
ICSANT:  No action
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kg 
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Israel
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 0.3 tons
Plutonium: 0.8 ± 0.15 tons
Notes
Israel’s government maintains extreme secrecy over 
every aspect of its nuclear development, from its still-
unacknowledged nuclear arsenal to its ﬁ ssile material 
stockpiles to its nuclear security arrangements. As a result, 
estimates of its stockpiles are highly uncertain. Israel is 
believed to possess approximately 80 nuclear weapons. 
Italy
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Signed a Megaports agreement with the United 
States
•  Status: COMPLETED (signed March 
2010)114
2. Establishing a school of nuclear security in 
Trieste
•  Status: COMPLETED (opened 
November 2010)115
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 100-200 kg 
Notes
Italy’s HEU stocks are chieﬂ y accounted for by its 
Tapiro fast-neutron reactor, whose fuel type makes 
it difﬁ cult to convert to LEU fuel. The reactor is used 
only intermittently.116 Italy also hosts an estimated 60-
70 American nuclear weapons at two locations.117
Japan
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Launching an integrated regional support center
•  Status: COMPLETED118
2. Research and development on detection and forensics
•  Status: COMPLETED (hosted the 
“International Workshop on Nuclear 
Forensics Following on Nuclear Security 
Summit” in October 2010)119
3. Contributing new resources to the Nuclear 
Security Fund
•  Status: COMPLETED120
4. Hosting a WINS best practices workshop
•  Status: COMPLETED (hosted 
September 2010)121
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: About 2,000 kg
Plutonium: 46.1 tons (36.1 tons stored outside country)
Notes
Japan accounts for the lion’s share of the separated 
plutonium located outside of the nuclear weapon 
states. It is “the only non-weapon state that 
reprocesses spent fuel and fabricates plutonium-
containing fuel.”122
Jordan
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM:  State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
None
Kazakhstan
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Converting an HEU research reactor and 
eliminating remaining HEU
•  Status: In progress. Sources indicate 
that the research reactor in Alatau is the 
intended target and that Kazakhstan is 
engaged in discussions with Russia and 
the United States about its conversion.123
However, no timeline for conversion has 
been made public. 
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2. Cooperative work on BN-350 reactor shutdown 
and fuel security 
•  Status: COMPLETED (completion 
announced in November 2010)124
3. Hosting a GICNT activity
•  Status: COMPLETED125
4. Considering an International Nuclear Security 
Training Center
•  Status: In progress. Kazakhstan’s 
president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, has 
promoted Kazakhstan as a potential 
location for the proposed center,126 but 
its status remains unclear.
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: At least 10,000 kg 
Plutonium: At least 3 tons (see below)
Notes
Kazakhstan has by far the largest holdings of HEU of 
any non-weapon state. This is almost entirely due to 
the fact that Kazakhstan inherited the Soviet Union’s 
BN-350 reactor. Most of the country’s 10,000 kg of 
HEU consists of spent fuel from that reactor, which 
was also used to breed plutonium for the Soviet 
Union’s nuclear weapons program.127 In November 
2010 the United States and other international 
partners completed a long-term effort to shut down 
the reactor and provide long-term storage for its 
spent fuel in a facility in eastern Kazakhstan. This 
included securing more than 10 tons of HEU and 
three tons of weapons-grade plutonium.128
Malaysia
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Passed new export control law
•  Status: COMPLETED (passed in April 
2010)129
International Instruments
CPPNM: No action
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
None
Mexico
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Converting an HEU research reactor and 
eliminating remaining HEU working through IAEA
•  Status: In progress. Mexico, Canada, 
and the United States signed a trilateral 
agreement at the Washington summit 
which provides for the elimination of 
Mexico’s HEU.130
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 10-100 kg. Mexico’s stocks of HEU are “on track 
to be cleaned out in the next few years.”131
Morocco
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: State Party (ratiﬁ ed March 2010)
Fissile Material Holdings
None
Netherlands
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: State Party (accepted June 2010)
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 730-810 kg
Notes
The Netherlands is a major producer of Mo-99 at 
its HFR research reactor in Petten. The reactor has 
been converted to use LEU fuel, but still uses HEU 
targets; as a result, the Netherlands continues to 
require stockpiles and shipments of HEU.132 The 
Netherlands also hosts an estimated 10-20 American 
nuclear weapons.133
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New Zealand
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Contributing to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund
•  Status: COMPLETED134
2. Contributing to the U.S. Nuclear Smuggling 
Outreach Initiative (NSOI)
•  Status: COMPLETED. According to the NSOI, 
“In 2010, New Zealand supplied radiological 
monitoring equipment for Boryspol 
International Airport in Kyiv, Ukraine.”135
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
None
Nigeria
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: No action
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: About 1 kg
Norway
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Contributing $3.3 million over the next four years 
to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund (ﬂ exible funds 
for use in developing countries)
•  Status: COMPLETED136
2. Contributing $500,000 in additional support to 
Kazakhstan’s efforts to upgrade portal monitors to 
prevent nuclear smuggling as part of the GICNT
•  Status: COMPLETED137
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 1-10 kg
Pakistan
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: No action
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 2.6 ± 1 tons
Plutonium: About 100 kg
Notes
Pakistan is thought to possess an arsenal of 90-110 
nuclear weapons. This number reﬂ ects a signiﬁ cant recent 
increase, as Pakistan is believed to have doubled its nuclear 
arsenal over the past several years.138 Virtually all of its 
ﬁ ssile material stockpiles are designated for military use; 
Islamabad “does not have a civilian plutonium program,”139
and its civilian stocks of HEU are estimated at only 17 kg.140
Analysts have expressed concern over the status of 
nuclear security in Pakistan due to the “extraordinary 
threats” it faces as a result of the presence of al-Qaeda and 
other extremist organizations in the country.141 However, 
Pakistan has also taken a number of signiﬁ cant steps to 
improve its nuclear security over the past decade.142
Philippines
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Joining the GICNT
•  Status: COMPLETED
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kg 
Poland
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT:  State Party (ratiﬁ ed April 2010)
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 100-1000 kg
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Notes
Over the past several years, there have been a number 
of high-proﬁ le HEU removals from Poland. Most notably, 
in October 2010 the NNSA announced that over 450 kg of 
HEU had been removed from Poland in ﬁ ve shipments 
over the previous year.143 It is unclear how much HEU 
remains following these removals, which involved clear-
ing out all HEU from Poland’s “Ewa” research reactor.144
The material left is concentrated in the “Maria” reactor, 
which uses HEU fuel to produce Mo-99, but is on track to 
convert to LEU fuel in mid-2012.145
Republic of Korea
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Hosting the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit.
•  Status: In progress. Will presumably happen.
2. Hosting a GICNT activity
•  Status: In progress. The GICNT’s next plenary 
session is scheduled for 2011 in Seoul.146
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kg
Notes
The Republic of Korea possesses an extensive nuclear 
power program and is seeking to become a major 
exporter of nuclear reactors, setting a goal of exporting 
80 nuclear power reactors by 2030.147
Russia
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Signing Plutonium Disposition protocol
•  Status: COMPLETED148
2. Ending plutonium production
•  Status: COMPLETED149
3. Contributing to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund 
•  Status: COMPLETED150
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 770 ± 120 tons 
Plutonium: About 175.7 tons 
Notes
As Harvard University’s Matthew Bunn notes, 
“Russia has the world’s largest stockpiles of 
nuclear weapons, plutonium, and HEU, located 
in the world’s largest numbers of buildings 
and bunkers.”151 Its estimated 11,000 nuclear 
warheads and hundreds of buildings containing 
nuclear materials alone mean that Russia is 
central to the broader nuclear security agenda.
The United States has a wide variety of 
programs in Russia whose functions include 
conducting security upgrades at nuclear 
facilities, consolidating Russian HEU, and 
converting Russian reactors to use LEU. These 
efforts have made varying degrees of progress 
in recent years. The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) reported that the Material 
Protection, Control and Accounting program has 
had the greatest success, conducting security 
upgrades at over one hundred sites. However, 
progress in terms of consolidating Russian HEU 
and converting Russian reactors to use LEU has 
been more limited.152
Saudi Arabia
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Hosting a UNSCR 1540 conference for Gulf 
Cooperation Council
•  Status: COMPLETED (hosted in Riyadh in 
December 2010)153
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party (accepted 
January 2011)
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
None
Singapore
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: No action
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
None
21
A
rm
s 
Co
nt
ro
l A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
an
d 
Pa
rt
ne
rs
hi
p 
fo
r G
lo
ba
l S
ec
ur
ity
South Africa
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 610-760 kg
Notes
South Africa is “the only non-weapon state that 
produced its own stockpile of HEU,” which is a legacy 
of its nuclear weapons program of the 1980s.154 South 
Africa is also a major producer of Mo-99, and it is leading 
the transition to produce it with LEU. In December 2010, 
South Africa’s Nuclear Energy Corporation delivered the 
ﬁ rst large-scale shipment of Mo-99 to the United States 
made using both LEU fuel and targets.155
Spain
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kg 
Sweden
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kg 
Switzerland
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 1-10 kg
Plutonium: <0.05 tons156
Thailand
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism
•  Status: COMPLETED
International Instruments
CPPNM: No action
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kg 
Turkey
National Commitments Made at NSS
None
International Instruments
CPPNM:  State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kg. Turkey was formally “cleaned out” of 
HEU in January 2010.157
Notes
Turkey is believed to host approximately 60-70 
American nuclear weapons.158
Ukraine
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Removing all HEU by next Summit — half of it by 
year’s end
•  Status: In progress (see below) 
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: Less than 62 kg (see below)
Notes
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Prior to 2010, Ukraine’s HEU was stored at three 
locations: a research reactor in Kiev, an experimental 
facility in Kharkiv, and a critical assembly in Sevastopol. 
Following on Ukraine’s commitment at the Washington 
summit, the United States completed two removals 
of HEU from Ukraine in 2010. In May 2010, 56 kg of 
HEU spent fuel were removed. According to the GAO, 
this represents “more than a third of Ukraine’s HEU 
inventory.”159 In December 2010 an additional 50 kg of 
HEU fresh fuel were removed.160
United Arab Emirates
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Signed a Megaports Agreement with the United 
States
•  Status: COMPLETED (signed 
December 2009)161
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party 
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
None
United Kingdom
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Contributing $6 million to the IAEA Nuclear 
Security Fund
•  Status: COMPLETED162
2. Inviting an IPPAS security review from the IAEA
•  Status: COMPLETED163
3. Ratiﬁ cation of ICSANT
•  Status: COMPLETED (ratiﬁ ed 
September 2009)
4. Ratiﬁ cation of 2005 CPPNM Amendment
•  Status: COMPLETED (ratiﬁ ed April 2010)
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: State Party
ICSANT: State Party
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 21.2 tons
Plutonium: 92.9 tons
Notes
The United Kingdom possesses a stockpile of 225 nuclear 
warheads, of which less than 160 are operationally 
available. According to the most recent British defense 
review, these numbers are scheduled to be reduced to 
180 and 120, respectively, by the mid-2020s.164
In addition, the United Kingdom also possesses 
extensive civilian stockpiles of ﬁ ssile materials, the result 
of “an extensive program of reprocessing spent fuel 
from power reactors.”165 The bulk of London’s plutonium 
(84.4 tons) is civilian, which makes it the largest stockpile 
of civilian plutonium in the world.166
United States
National Commitments Made at NSS167
1. Request an IPPAS mission
•  Status: In progress. The United States 
has formally declared its intention to 
request an IPPAS mission.168
2. Accelerate efforts to ratify ICSANT and the 
CPPNM 2005 Amendment
•  Status: In progress. According to 
Washington’s national statement, 
legislation that would bring U.S. laws 
into line with both treaties has been 
submitted to Congress. Neither treaty 
has been ratiﬁ ed.
3. Convert its six remaining HEU-fueled reactors
•  Status: In progress. The United States 
is currently developing new fuel that will 
allow it to convert the ﬁ nal six reactors.
4. Sign Plutonium Disposition protocol
•  Status: COMPLETED169
5. Bring up to 100 kg of plutonium from sites of 
concern into the United States pending disposition
•  Status: In progress. This project is in the 
“ﬁ nal stages of approval.”170
6. Develop and deploy new neutron detection 
technologies
•  Status: In progress. The U.S. Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Ofﬁ ce has begun 
“performance tests of 11 neutron 
detector variations to identify promising 
technologies.”171
7. Launch an international effort to develop a 
nuclear forensics library, exercises, common 
lexicons, and other foundational elements for 
cooperation in nuclear forensics 
•  Status: In progress. In November 
2010 the United States and Japan 
established a bilateral Nuclear Security 
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Working Group, and agreed “to expand 
joint activities in the ﬁ elds of nuclear 
forensics.”172
8. Provide ﬁ nancial support for WINS
•  Status: COMPLETED173
9. Requested the largest ever amount for nuclear 
security programs in its ﬁ scal year 2011 budget
•  Status: COMPLETED. However, 
the increased funding has not been 
appropriated, as the U.S. Congress has 
not yet approved a ﬁ nal budget for ﬁ scal 
year 2011.
10. Proposing a voluntary fund to help countries 
meet their obligations under Resolution 1540
•  Status: COMPLETED. The United 
States proposed the fund, and the White 
House requested $3 million for it in ﬁ scal 
year 2011 and $1.5 million in ﬁ scal year 
2012.174
11. Led efforts at the IAEA to establish for the ﬁ rst 
time a dedicated line item for nuclear security in 2009
•  Status: COMPLETED
12. Support extension of the Global Partnership
•  Status: In progress. The United States 
has advocated for a 10-year extension 
of the Global Partnership and pledged 
to commit an additional $10 billion to 
support it, but it has so far not occurred.
International Instruments
CPPNM: State Party
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT: Signatory
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 614 tons
Plutonium: 91.9 tons 
Notes
The United States has been a leading force in helping 
to remove and secure nuclear materials in other 
nations. In recent years, its Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative has worked to shut down or convert 72 HEU 
research reactors and remove a cumulative total 
of 2,852 kg of HEU around the world.175 The United 
States has worked with 19 countries to remove “all 
HEU material,” and is working with 16 additional 
nations “to remove the last of their material.”176
As of September 2009, the United States had 5,113 
nuclear weapons deployed and in reserve, plus 
several thousand awaiting dismantlement.177 The 
majority of its ﬁ ssile material stockpile is designated 
for military purposes. For HEU, 260 tons is used for 
weapons and 230 tons reserved as fuel for naval 
reactors.178 When it comes to plutonium, 38.3 tons 
are either in weapons or weapons laboratories; 
the rest has been declared as “excess.”179 As part of 
its plan to dispose of these materials, the United 
States concluded an agreement with Russia for each 
country to dispose of at least 34 tons of weapons-
grade plutonium starting in 2018. The United States is 
also in the process of blending down large amounts 
of its HEU: it has designated 235 tons of its HEU for 
blend-down, of which 131 have already been blended 
down and 104 tons remain to be eliminated.180
Vietnam
National Commitments Made at NSS
1. Converting a highly enriched uranium research 
reactor
•  Status: In progress. The reactor, located 
in Dalat, was partially converted from 
HEU to LEU in 2007. The United States 
and Vietnam reached an agreement “to 
complete the full conversion” of the 
reactor in December 2010.181
2. Joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism
•  Status: COMPLETED
International Instruments
CPPNM: No action
CPPNM 2005 Amendment: No action
ICSANT:  No action
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 1-10 kg
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Education, Training, and 
Cooperation Initiatives
Canada, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, 
Japan, and South Korea have either 
held or plan to hold international 
conferences related to nuclear 
security. 
The IAEA is conducting International 
Physical Protection Advisory Service 
(IPPAS) missions in the United 
Kingdom and Finland. 
France is incorporating nuclear 
security into the curriculum at the 
European Nuclear Safety Training 
and Tutoring Initiative and Italy 
opened a nuclear security training 
center for developing world 
professionals.
India, China, and Japan are 
establishing centers of excellence to 
encourage regional and multilateral 
cooperation on nuclear security. 
2010 Nuclear Security Summit
Progress on National Commitments
Treaties and Conventions
Armenia, Georgia, and the United 
Kingdom ratiﬁ ed the International 
Convention for the Suppression of 
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). 
Germany and the United Kingdom 
ratified the 2005 Amendment to 
the Convention for the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material. 
Domestic Legal Action
Egypt, Armenia, and Malaysia 
strengthened export control laws 
and increased penalties for nuclear 
material smuggling. 
Italy and the United Arab Emirates 
signed Megaports agreements with 
the U.S. to improve nuclear and 
radiological detection capabilities 
at major shipping ports.
Plutonium Disposition
Russia and the United States 
signed the protocol to the PMDA 
and Russia ceased its remaining 
Plutonium production. 
HEU Removal and Reactor Conversion
HEU removal is underway in Canada, Mexico, Poland, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam. 
Chile gave up its remaining HEU and non-NSS attendee Belarus returned half of its HEU. 
Reactor conversions are underway in Mexico, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam. The U.S. will 
convert six HEU reactors when technology allows.
National Commitment Categories
Plutonium Management and 
Disposition Agreement
Education, Training, and 
Cooperation Initiatives
HEU Removal in progress 
or completed
Domestic Legal Action
International Treaties and 
Conventions
Summit Attendee
Reactor Conversion 
Underway or Completed
Source details indicated in report’s endnotes. Sarah J. Williams/March 2011
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•  Chile sent all of its highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) to the United States.
•  Kazakhstan secured enough HEU and 
plutonium to make 775 nuclear weapons.
•  Russia ended its plutonium production and 
signed a plutonium disposition protocol with 
the United States.
Countries that have made important progress 
implementing their commitments include:
•  China signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the United States to work 
together on establishing a nuclear security 
Center of Excellence in China. 
•  Ukraine removed over half of its HEU, putting 
it on track to meet its pledge to eliminate all of 
its HEU by the 2012 summit.
Additionally, in fulﬁ llment of their national 
commitments:
•  Six countries hosted educational activities such 
as conferences and workshops. 
•  Three states passed new export control laws to 
protect nuclear materials against misuse. 
•  Three countries ratiﬁ ed the International 
Convention on the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism.
•  Two countries ratiﬁ ed the Amendment to 
the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material.
•  Four new countries joined the Global Initiative 
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
•  Five countries implemented activities to 
prevent and interdict nuclear smuggling.
•  Two countries initiated or completed an IAEA 
International Physical Protection Advisory 
Service mission.
•  Six countries provided the IAEA with 
additional nuclear security funds.
In short, most participants are on their way to 
fulﬁ lling their national pledges. In addition, South 
Africa stands out as having made commendable 
progress on the work plan objective of minimizing 
the use of HEU. After working with the NNSA to 
convert HEU reactors, the South African Nuclear 
Security Corporation (NECSA) shipped the ﬁ rst batch 
of Mo-99 produced with low-enriched uranium (LEU) 
to the United States in December 2010.182  NESCA’s 
subsidiary, NTP Radioisotopes, Ltd., is now the world’s 
ﬁ rst and only large-scale LEU-based Mo-99 supplier in 
the global marketplace.
Less progress appears to have been made on some 
of the work plan’s more ambitious objectives, such as 
the consolidation of national sites that hold nuclear 
materials. However, due to the sensitive nature of 
nuclear issues, complete information on all of the 
actions taken by countries may not be publicized 
or disclosed to those outside of government. While 
governments are likely to publicize actions such as 
One year after the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, many countries have made considerable progress implementing their summit commitments.Notable completed national commitments include:
Conclusion
27
A
rm
s 
Co
nt
ro
l A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
an
d 
Pa
rt
ne
rs
hi
p 
fo
r G
lo
ba
l S
ec
ur
ity
ratifying treaties and making funding commitments, 
they are less likely to discuss physical protection 
upgrades, for example, in open sources. Additionally, 
negotiations on bilateral or multilateral agreements 
may take years to yield results, and the status of 
ongoing negotiations is unlikely to be known until 
breakthroughs are achieved. As a result of these 
barriers, a transparent review of commitment 
implementation at the 2012 summit will be 
important to fully understand how the NSS process 
has advanced global nuclear security. 
The countries participating in the NSS process 
are still ﬁ nalizing their approach to tracking and 
reporting on the implementation of commitments 
made in Washington. Nevertheless, the scheduling 
of a second summit in 2012 is acting as a forcing 
mechanism to spur commitment implementation. 
Developing ways to demonstrate the progress that has 
been made—not only to summit participants but also 
to the public and countries outside the process—is 
crucial to building on the summit’s momentum, 
making the process credible, and furthering the 
nuclear security agenda. 
However, if the 2012 NSS focuses solely on 
achieving compliance with existing nuclear 
material security arrangements—as the Washington 
summit did—we will have missed an important 
opportunity to push the regime beyond its current 
limits to better address twenty-ﬁ rst century threats. 
The NSS process has brought high-level political 
attention to a previously obscure issue that was 
the domain of technical and policy experts. This 
attention through the summit process should 
be preserved and used as a vehicle for sustained 
nuclear security advancement. As the 2012 NSS 
approaches, countries should be considering 
what new initiatives, funding mechanisms, and 
collaborations could be initiated in 2012. Of course, 
such proposals are predicated on recognition 
among summit participants that more needs to be 
done at an international level over the long term to 
prevent nuclear terrorism.
A core achievement of the 2010 NSS was forging 
the consensus that nuclear terrorism is among the 
top global security challenges today and that strong 
nuclear security measures are the most effective 
way to prevent it. The objective for the 2012 NSS 
should be to gain international agreement that the 
current regime needs to be further fortiﬁ ed and 
harmonized to prevent nuclear terrorism. States will 
need to acknowledge that nuclear material security 
is an ongoing challenge, and international efforts to 
protect sensitive materials must continually improve 
and evolve to address new threats. The NSS process 
offers a unique vehicle with great potential for 
moving the agenda forward.
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Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material (CPPNM): The only in-
ternational legally binding undertaking in the
area of physical protection of nuclear material. 
Signed in Vienna and New York on March 3, 
1980, it establishes measures related to the pre-
vention, detection, and punishment of offenses 
relating to nuclear material. A diplomatic con-
ference in July 2005 was convened to amend 
the convention and strengthen its provisions. 
The amended convention makes it legally bind-
ing for states-parties to protect nuclear facili-
ties and material in peaceful domestic use and 
storage as well as transport. It provides for ex-
panded cooperation between and among states 
regarding rapid measures to locate and recover 
stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate 
any radiological consequences of sabotage, 
and prevent and combat related offenses. The 
amendments will take effect once they have 
been ratified by two-thirds of the states-parties 
of the convention.
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR / Nunn-
Lugar):  Since 1991, the CTR program has 
worked to secure and eliminate weapons of mass 
destruction and their related materials, espe-
cially in the states of the former Soviet Union. 
Initially seen as an immediate response to the 
chaos as the Soviet Union was collapsing, it later 
came to be seen as part of a broader effort to 
keep nuclear weapons and materials out of the 
hands of terrorists. The program is run by the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency in the Depart-
ment of Defense.
Enrichment: Uranium enrichment increases the 
percentage of fissile uranium-235 in a batch of 
nuclear fuel. Low levels of enrichment are suit-
able for use in civilian nuclear power reactors, 
while highly enriched uranium (HEU) can be 
used to build a nuclear weapon.
Fissile material: Material that contains elements 
whose nuclei are able to be split by neutrons 
of various speeds. Uranium-233, uranium-235, 
and plutonium-239 are all fissile materials. Fis-
sile materials undergo fission more easily than 
other fissionable materials and are more desir-
able for most reactor types and essential for 
nuclear explosives.
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
(GICNT): A voluntary association of states, es-
tablished in 2006, committed to sharing infor-
mation and expertise in order to prevent nuclear 
terrorism. Eighty-two states currently participate 
in the initiative.
Global Partnership Against the Spread of 
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruc-
tion: An initiative launched in 2002 at the 
Group of Eight summit in Kananaskis to prevent 
terrorists or those who harbor them from acquir-
ing or developing nuclear, chemical, radiologi-
cal, and biological weapons; missiles; and related 
materials, equipment, and technology.
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI):
A collaborative program aimed at reducing and 
protecting vulnerable nuclear and radiological 
materials located at civilian sites worldwide. 
Launched in 2004, the GTRI helps the U.S. De-
partment of Energy achieve its nuclear security 
goal to prevent the acquisition of nuclear and 
radiological materials for use in weapons of 
mass destruction and other acts of terrorism 
by repatriating or otherwise securing nuclear 
fuel and converting reactors to use new, more 
proliferation-resistant technology. Three key 
subprograms of the GTRI—convert, remove, and 
protect—provide a comprehensive approach to 
denying terrorists access to nuclear and radio-
logical materials. The program is run by the Na-
tional Nuclear Security Administration.
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Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU): Uranium 
that has been processed to increase the propor-
tion of the U-235 isotope to more than 20 per-
cent. HEU is required for the construction of a 
gun-type nuclear device, the simplest type of 
nuclear weapon. The greater the proportion of 
U-235, i.e., the higher the enrichment level, the 
less material that is needed to cause a nuclear 
detonation. Weapons-grade uranium generally 
refers to uranium enriched to at least 90 percent, 
but material of far lower enrichment levels can be 
used to create a nuclear explosive device.
IAEA Nuclear Security Fund: A voluntary funding
mechanism, to which International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) member states are called 
on to contribute. The fund was established to 
support, among others things, the implementa-
tion of nuclear security activities to prevent, 
detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. The 
fund’s lifetime has been extended twice; the cur-
rent Nuclear Security Plan is scheduled to run 
through 2013. 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):
International organization based in Vienna
charged with monitoring and safeguarding
nuclear material and facilities under the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and with helping states
pursue peaceful nuclear programs through tech-
nical cooperation. It was set up as the world’s
Atoms for Peace organization in 1957 within 
the UN structure. The IAEA Secretariat is a team 
of 2,200 multidisciplinary professional and 
support staff from more than 90 countries. The 
agency is led by Director-General Yukiya Ama-
no and six deputy directors-general who head 
the major departments.
International Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT): Inter-
national agreement opened for signature in 2005 
that criminalizes the planning, threatening, or 
implementation of acts of nuclear terrorism and 
requires states-parties to pass national legislation 
to that effect.
International Physical Protection Advisory 
Service (IPPAS): This service was created by 
the IAEA in order to assist states in strengthen-
ing nuclear security within their borders. Dur-
ing an IPPAS review, IAEA experts will examine 
facilities within a country where nuclear or ra-
dioactive materials are kept. They will compare 
the facilities’ systems of physical protection 
with international guidelines and best practices, 
and make suggestions for follow-on activities or 
security upgrades.
Megaports Initiative: A U.S. government program
that works with foreign partners to enhance se-
curity at ports around the world. The initiative 
helps equip major ports with radiation detection 
equipment, as well as provide training for foreign 
personnel. Foreign cooperation with the initia-
tive is typically formalized by signing a bilateral 
“Megaports agreement.” The program is run by 
the National Nuclear Security Administration.
2010 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS): A meeting 
of 47 national delegations and the European 
Union, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), and the United Nations held in Washing-
ton, DC, April 12–13, 2010, to enhance interna-
tional cooperation in preventing nuclear terror-
ism. The participants agreed on a communiqué 
and a work plan. In their national statements, 
many states described speciﬁ c steps they will 
take to advance nuclear security. The summit 
was ﬁ rst proposed by President Barack Obama 
in an April 2009 speech in Prague where he out-
lined his vision of a world free of nuclear weap-
ons and nuclear threats.
Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI): 
A U.S. government program which collaborates 
with foreign governments to prevent, detect, and 
respond to incidents of nuclear smuggling. The pro-
gram is housed in the State Department’s Bureau of 
International Security and Nonproliferation.
Research reactor: Small nuclear reactors used for 
scientiﬁ c research and the production of radio-
active materials used in medicine and industry. 
Many utilize highly enriched uranium as a fuel, 
unlike larger civilian power reactors, which oper-
ate on low enriched uranium.
Resolution 1540: A UN Security Council resolution 
passed in 2004 mandating that states establish 
domestic controls to prevent nonstate actors 
from acquiring nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons or related materials.
World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS):
A nongovernmental body that aims to provide 
a forum for nuclear security professionals to dis-
cuss and exchange best security practices. As of 
August 2010, WINS has over 400 corporate and 
individual members from over 50 countries.
The 2010 N
uclear Security Sum
m
it: A
 Status U
pdate
30
NOTES
1. International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile 
Materials Report 2010: Balancing the Books: Production and 
Stocks,” December 2010, p. 9, http://www.ipfmlibrary.org/
gfmr10.pdf.
2. “National Security Summit National Statement of the 
United States,” The White House, April 13, 2010, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁ ce/nuclear-security-
summit-national-statement-united-states; “Highlights 
of National Commitments made at the Nuclear Security 
Summit,”  The White House, April 13, 2010, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁ ce/highlights-national-
commitments-made-nss. 
3. “Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security 
Summit,” The White House, April 13, 2010, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁ ce/communiqu-washington-
nuclear-security-summit; “Work Plan of the Washington 
Nuclear Security Summit,” The White House, April 13, 2010, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁ ce/work-plan-
washington-nuclear-security-summit. 
4. “International Convention for the Suppression of Acts 
of Nuclear Terrorism,” United Nations Treaty Collection, 
Status as of January 31, 2011, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-15&chapter
=18&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en. 
5. France reiterated its national commitment to ratify the 
2005 Amendment in May 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty Review Conference (http://www.francetnp2010.fr/spip.
php?article79) and in a survey response to the Fissile Materials 
Working Group dated January 4, 2011;  Amendment to the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,”, 
Status as of December 30, 2010, International Atomic Energy 
Agency, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Conventions/cppnm_amend_status.pdf. 
6. “Ahead of Nuclear Security Summit, NNSA Announces 
Removal of All Highly Enriched Uranium from Chile,” 
National Nuclear Security Administration (hereafter 
“NNSA”), April 8, 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/
pressreleases/04.08.10. 
7. “NNSA Achieves Milestone in Removal of HEU from 
Ukraine,” NNSA, December 31, 2010, http://nnsa.energy.
gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/ukraineheuremoval. 
8. “Joint Statement by Co-Chairs of the U.S.-Kazakhstan 
Energy Partnership On Successful Completion of the U.S.-
Kazakhstan BN-350 Spent Fuel Program,” NNSA, November 
17, 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/
spentfuelstatement111710. 
9. “Trilateral Announcement Between Mexico, the United 
States, and Canada on Nuclear Security,” The White House, 
April 13, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁ ce/
trilateral-announcement-between-mexico-united-states-and-
canada-nuclear-security. 
10. Fissile Materials Working Group survey response 
provided by the Embassy of Mexico in Washington, D.C., 
February 23, 2011.
11. “U.S. and Vietnam Cooperate on Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
in Dalat,” U.S. Embassy Hanoi, Vietnam, December 8, 2010, 
http://vietnam.usembassy.gov/pr120810.html.
12. “PM announces a nuclear cooperation project with 
the United States to further secure inventories of spent 
highly enriched uranium,” Prime Minister of Canada’s 
Ofﬁ ce, April 12, 2010, http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.
asp?category=1&id=3278. 
13. “Nuclear Security Summit National Statement of the 
United States.”
14. “U.S.-Belarus Bilateral Meeting,” Department of 
State, December 1, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2010/12/152168.htm; Glenn Kessler and Mary Beth 
Sheridan, “Belarus agrees to give up stockpile of highly 
enriched uranium,” Washington Post, December 1, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/12/01/AR2010120101198.html.
15. Kessler and Sheridan, “Belarus agrees to give up stockpile 
of highly enriched uranium.”
16. “Press Brieﬁ ng by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, 
12/1/2010,” The White House, December 1, 2010, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁ ce/2010/12/01/press-
brieﬁ ng-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-1212010.
17. Martin Matishak, “Global Nuclear Materials Lockdown 
Take Longer Than Four Years,” February 22, 2011, http://gsn.
nti.org/gsn/nw_20110222_2593.php. 
18. “NNSA Completes Largest Highly Enriched Uranium 
(HEU) Fuel Return Campaign in Program’s History,” NNSA, 
October 12, 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/
pressreleases/polandheu101210.
19. “NNSA Announces Removal of All Highly Enriched 
Uranium (HEU) from Serbia,” NNSA, December 22, 
2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/
serbiaheu122210; “Ahead of Nuclear Security Summit, 
NNSA Announces Removal of All Highly Enriched Uranium 
from Chile,” NNSA, April 8, 2010, http://nnsa.energy.
gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/04.08.10;  “NNSA Announces 
Highly Enriched Uranium Removed from Turkey,” NNSA, 
January 12, 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/
pressreleases/01.12.10;  “NNSA Announces Removal of Last 
Highly Enriched Uranium from Romania; Air Shipment of 
Russia-Origin Spent Fuel,” NNSA, June 30, 2009, http://nnsa.
energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/06.30.09;  “Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better 
Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear 
Materials Worldwide,” Government Accountability Ofﬁ ce, 
GAO-11-227, December 2010, http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d11227.pdf. 
20. “Russia shuts down last plutonium reactor: ofﬁ cials,” 
Nuclear Power Daily, April 15, 2010, http://www.
nuclearpowerdaily.com/reports/Russia_shuts_down_last_
plutonium_reactor_ofﬁ cials_999.html. 
21. Ibid. 
22. “Signing of the Plutonium Disposition Protocol,” 
Department of State, April 13, 2010, http://www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2010/04/140120.htm.  
23. Elena Sokova, “Plutonium Disposition,” Issue Brief, Nuclear 
Threat Reduction Initiative, September 16, 2010, http://www.
nti.org/e_research/e3_plutonium_disposition.html.
24. “U.S. and Vietnam Cooperate on Nuclear Non-
Proliferation in Dalat.” 
25. Personal communications with a knowledgeable expert, 
31
A
rm
s 
Co
nt
ro
l A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
an
d 
Pa
rt
ne
rs
hi
p 
fo
r G
lo
ba
l S
ec
ur
ity
The 2010 N
uclear Security Sum
m
it: A
 Status U
pdate
32
January 2011. 
26. “Trilateral Announcement Between Mexico, the United 
States, and Canada on Nuclear Security.”
27. Fissile Materials Working Group survey response 
provided by the Embassy of Mexico in Washington, D.C., 
February 23, 2011. 
28. “Nuclear Security Summit National Statement of the 
United States.”
29. “Russia to allocate over $6mln to IAEA’s Nuclear Security 
Fund,” Interfax, December 5, 2010, http://interfax.com/
newsinf.asp?id=206844. 
30. “UK Signs Agreement to Contribute to IAEA Nuclear 
Security Fund,” IAEA, March 8, 2011, http://www.iaea.org/
newscenter/news/2011/uknsfund.html. 
31. “Nuclear Security Report 2010,” IAEA, GOV/2010/42-
GC(54)/9, August 12, 2010, http://www.iaea.org/About/
Policy/GC/GC54/GC54Documents/English/gc54-9_en.pdf.
32. Personal communication with White House staff 
indicates that Belgium and New Zealand are among the 
countries that have “donated signiﬁ cant amounts of money 
and resources to nuclear security related causes such as the 
G8 Global Partnership and the IAEA.” 
33. Nuclear Security Report 2010.
34. H.E. Marjatta Rasi, “Statement by Finland,” 53rd General 
Conference of the IAEA, September 2009, http://www.iaea.
org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/Statements/ﬁ nland.pdf.  
35. Fissile Materials Working Group survey response by the 
Embassy of Finland in Washington, D.C., January 31, 2011. 
36. “Nuclear Security Summit National Statement of the 
United States.”
37. Personal communications with WINS staff, February 
2011.   
38. “Annual Report 2010: Sharing the Knowledge,” The 
World Institute for Nuclear Security, March 2011, http://
www.wins.org/content.aspx?id=119. 
39. Roger Howsley, “Promoting Nuclear Security Best 
Practices and Security Leadership Around the World,”   
Presented at “Prospects for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament: Beyond the NPT Review Conference and 
Nuclear Security Summit,” Cairo, Egypt, October 21, 2010, 
http://fmwg.presstools.org/sites/default/ﬁ les/Howsley%20-
%20WINS%20-%20Cairo%20Meeting.pdf. 
40. “Nuclear nonproliferation support center opens,” The 
Denki Shimbun, February 8, 2011, http://www.shimbun.
denki.or.jp/en/news/20110208_01.html. 
41. N. Kimura, Y. Naoi, and S. Wakabayashi, “Integrated 
support center for nuclear nonproliferation and security 
for Asia,” IAEA, November 2010, http://www.iaea.org/
OurWork/SV/Safeguards/Symposium/2010/Documents/
AbstractsRepository/052.pdf. 
42. “Fact Sheet on U.S.-Japan Cooperation on Reducing 
Nuclear Risks,” The White House, November 12, 2010, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁ ce/2010/11/12/
fact-sheet-us-japan-cooperation-reducing-nuclear-risks. 
43. “Nuclear Security Summit National Statement of the 
United States.”
44. “International Workshop on Nuclear Forensics Following 
on Nuclear Security Summit,” Techno Community Square 
“Ricotti,” Tokai, Japan, October 5-6, 2010, http://www.jaea.
go.jp/04/np/activity/2010-10-05/index_en.html. 
45. “Fact Sheet: U.S. China Sign Agreement to Establish 
Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security,” The White House, 
January 19, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
ofﬁ ce/2011/01/19/fact-sheet-us-china-sign-agreement-
establish-center-excellence-nuclear-s. 
46. “U.S., China Sign Agreement to Establish Center of 
Excellence on Nuclear Security,” NNSA, January 19, 2011, 
http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/chinacenter
ofexcellence01.19.11. 
47. “Experts Praise Proposed Nuclear Security Centers,” 
Partnership for Global Security, February 3, 2010, http://
www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/PDFFrameset.
asp?PDF=centers_of_excellence.pdf. 
48. “Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership,” Press 
Information Bureau, August 12, 2010, http://pib.nic.in/
release/release.asp?relid=64718. 
49. Ibid; “World’s ﬁ rst nuclear energy partnership 
centre in state,” The Times of India, December 4, 2010, 
http://timesoﬁ ndia.indiatimes.com/city/gurgaon/
Worlds-ﬁ rst-nuclear-energy-partnership-centre-in-state/
articleshow/7038644.cms.
50. World’s ﬁ rst nuclear energy partnership centre in state,” 
The Times of India, December 4, 2010, http://timesoﬁ ndia.
indiatimes.com/city/gurgaon/Worlds-ﬁ rst-nuclear-energy-
partnership-centre-in-state/articleshow/7038644.cms. 
51. “Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime 
Minister Singh of India,” The White House Ofﬁ ce of the 
Press Secretary, November 8, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-ofﬁ ce/2010/11/08/joint-statement-president-
obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india
52. “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
Key Multilateral Workshops and Exercises,” U.S. 
State Department, http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/145498.pdf.
53. Nursultan Nazarbayev, “Global World and Nuclear 
Security,” European Dialogue, April 2010, http://eurodialogue.
org/Global-World-and-Nuclear-Security.  
54. “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Key 
Multilateral Workshops and Exercises;” “Joint Co-Chair 
Statement Regarding the 2010 Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism Plenary Meeting,” U.S. State Department, 
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, June 29, 2010, http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/143754.htm; “Statement 
by Dr. Ju-Ho LEE Mister of Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology Head Delegate of the Republic of Korea At 
the 54th General Conference of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency,” IAEA, September 9, 2010, pg 5-6,  http://
www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC54/Statements/rok.pdf.
55.  Peter Kaiser, Bruna Lecossois, and Andrey Pryakhin, 
“IAEA and ICTP Open Nuclear Energy Management School,” 
IAEA, November 22, 2010, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/
news/2010/nemschool.html. 
56. “Opening speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the 
Republic,” International Conference on access to civil 
nuclear energy, Paris, March 8, 2010, http://ambafrance-
us.org/spip.php?article1547. 
57. Fissile Materials Working Group survey response from 
France’s Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation Unit 
in the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs in Paris, 
January 4, 2011. 
58. “Programme 2011,” ENSTTI, accessed March 14, 2011,  
http://www.enstti.eu/Pages/Training.aspx. 
59. “Saudi Arabia Set to Host Workshop on the 
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) 
in Riyadh, 11-12 December,” United Nation Department of 
Public Information, December 9, 2010, http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs//2010/dc3275.doc.htm.
60. “NNSA Launches Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure 
Institute to Promote Nuclear Safety and Security,” NNSA 
Press Release, February 22, 2011, http://nnsa.energy.gov/
mediaroom/pressreleases/gneii02.22.11. 
61. CHO Hyun, “Preparation for Nuclear Security Summit 
2012 and Possible Deliverables,” The 9th ROK-UN 
Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues, 
Jeju, December 3, 2010.  
62. “Statement by Dr. Ju-Ho LEE Mister of Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology Head Delegate of the 
Republic of Korea At the 54th General Conference of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency,” IAEA, September 9, 
2010, pg 5-6,  http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC54/
Statements/rok.pdf. 
63. Bonnie D. Jenkins, “Readout on 2012 Nuclear Security 
Summit Preparations,” Foreign Press Center Brieﬁ ng, 
Washington, D.C., September 8, 2010, http://www.state.gov/
t/isn/rls/rm/150043.htm.
64. Ibid.
65. “Egypt bank to raise funds for nuclear power plants,” 
Al-Shorfa, April 6, 2010, http://www.al-shorfa.com/cocoon/
meii/xhtml/en_GB/features/meii/features/main/2010/04/06/
feature-02; “Mubarak approves nuclear radioactive law,” 
Egypt State Information Service, March 31, 2010, http://www.
us.sis.gov.eg/En/Story.aspx?sid=47479.  
66. “Egypt bank to raise funds for nuclear power plants.”
67. Communications with U.S. Department of State export 
control and related border security assistance staff, February 
2011. 
68. “The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” 
U.S. Department of State, accessed February 4, 2011, http://
www.state.gov/t/isn/c18406.htm. 
69. “Joint Co-Chair Statement Regarding the 2010 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Plenary 
Meeting,” U.S. State Department, Abu Dhabi, United Arab 
Emirates, June 29, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2010/06/143754.htm. 
70. C.S Eliot Kang, “Enhancing International Partnerships,” 
Remarks at the 2009 Plenary Meeting of the Global Initiative 
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, June 16, 2009, http://www.
state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/125349.htm. 
71. “Joint Co-Chair Statement Regarding the 2010 Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Plenary Meeting.” 
72. “U.S. and United Arab Emirates Sign Megaports Initiative 
Agreement Aimed at Preventing Nuclear Smuggling,” NNSA, 
December 16, 2009, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/
pressreleases/12.16.09. 
73. Ibid. 
74. “U.S. and Italy Sign Megaports Initiative Agreement to 
Prevent Smuggling of Nuclear and Radioactive Material,” 
NNSA, March 29, 2010, http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/
mediaroom/pressreleases/03.29.10. 
75. Ibid.
76. “Details of Assistance Being Provided to NSOI-Developed 
Projects: New Zealand,” Nuclear Smuggling Outreach 
Initiative, accessed February 4, 2011, http://www.nsoi-state.
net/ourpartners/newzealand.asp. 
77. Ibid.
78. “Norway Increases Support of NNSA Work to Combat 
Nuclear Smuggling,” NNSA, December 3, 2010, http://nnsa.
energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/norway120310. 
79.  Ibid. 
80. “Nuclear Security Summit National Statement of the 
United States.”
81. Bonnie Jenkins, “The Future Role of the G-8 Global 
Partnership: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, June 2010, http://
www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/pab/Jenkins_610.pdf; 
“Nuclear Security Summit National Statement of the United 
States.”
82. Chris Schneidmiller, “G-8 Nonproliferation Program 
Faces Uncertain Future,” Global Security Newswire, August 
16, 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_
20100815_3867.php. 
83. Fissile Material Working Group communications with 
Canadian ofﬁ cials.  
84. “Global Efforts in WMD Threat Reduction,” Fissile 
Materials Working Group, accessed February 28, 2011, 
http://fmwg.presstools.org/node/36600. 
85. International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile 
Materials Report 2010: Balancing the Books: Production and 
Stocks” (hereafter “GFMR 2010”), December 2010, p. 142.
86. “EXBS Director Visits Armenia and Praises Legislative 
Reform,” EXBS Quarterly Newsletter 2 (January 2011), p. 5, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/155368.pdf.
87. “GFMR 2010,” p. 142.
88. “U.S.-Belarus Bilateral Meeting.” 
89. “Press Brieﬁ ng by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, 
12/1/2010.”
90. Personal communications with White House staff, 
April 2011.
91. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Tactical 
Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 67 (January/February 2011), p. 68.
92. “Backgrounder: Repatriation of U.S.-origin highly 
enriched uranium from Chalk River,” Canada News Center, 
April 12, 2010, http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?m=/
index&nid=524689.
93. “Canada’s initiatives under the G-8 Global Partnership,” 
Prime Minister of Canada, April 14, 2010, http://pm.gc.ca/
eng/media.asp?id=3289.
94. “Trilateral Announcement Between Mexico, the United 
States, and Canada on Nuclear Security.”
33
A
rm
s 
Co
nt
ro
l A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
an
d 
Pa
rt
ne
rs
hi
p 
fo
r G
lo
ba
l S
ec
ur
ity
The 2010 N
uclear Security Sum
m
it: A
 Status U
pdate
34
95. Howsley, “Promoting Nuclear Security Best Practices and 
Security Leadership Around the World.”
96. “Canada,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2009, http://
www.nti.org/db/heu/canada.html.
97. Miles A. Pomper and William C. Potter, “Medical isotope 
production: The US must follow South Africa’s lead,” Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, December 17, 2010, http://www.
thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/medical-isotope-
production-the-us-must-follow-south-africas-lead.
98. “Ahead of Nuclear Security Summit, NNSA Announces 
Removal of All Highly Enriched Uranium from Chile.”
99. “U.S., China Sign Agreement to Establish Center of 
Excellence on Nuclear Security.”
100. “GFMR 2010,” p. 97.
101. Ibid, p. 106.
102. Ibid, p. 142.
103. “Egypt banks to raise funds for nuclear power plants,” 
Al-Shorfa, April 6, 2010, http://www.al-shorfa.com/cocoon/
meii/xhtml/en_GB/features/meii/features/main/2010/04/06/
feature-02.
104. H.E. Marjatta Rasi, “Statement by Finland,” 53rd 
General Conference of the IAEA.
105. French response to FMWG questionnaire, January 4, 
2011.
106. Ibid.
107. “Programme 2011,” European Nuclear Safety Training 
and Tutoring Institute, http://www.enstti.eu/Pages/Training.
aspx.
108. “GFMR 2010,” p. 13, 19.
109. Ibid, p. 142.
110. Norris and Kristensen, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons 
in Europe, 2011,” p. 66.
111. “Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime 
Minister Singh of India.”
112. “GFMR 2010,” p. 14. 
113. Ibid, p. 21.
114. “U.S. and Italy Sign Megaports Initiative Agreement to 
Prevent Smuggling of Nuclear and Radioactive Material.”
115. Kaiser, Lecossois, and Pryakhin, “IAEA and ICTP Open 
Nuclear Energy Management School.”
116. “GFMR 2010,” p. 142.
117. Norris and Kristensen, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons 
in Europe, 2011,” p. 69.
118. “Nuclear nonproliferation support center opens.”
119. “International Workshop on Nuclear Forensics 
Following on Nuclear Security Summit,” Japan Atomic 
Energy Agency, October 5, 2010, http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/
np/activity/2010-10-05/index_en.html.
120. The IAEA’s “Nuclear Security Report 2010” noted a new 
pledge or contribution from Japan in the time period from 
July 2009 to June 2010. See: “Nuclear Security Report 2010,” 
IAEA, GOV/2010/42-GC(54)/9, August 12, 2010, http://www.
iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC54/GC54Documents/English/
gc54-9_en.pdf.
121. “Promoting Nuclear Security Best Practices and Security 
Leadership Around the World.”
122. “GFMR 2010,” p. 136.
123. Communications with a knowledgeable expert, January 
2011.
124. “Joint Statement By Co-Chairs of the U.S.-Kazakhstan 
Energy Partnership On Successful Completion of the U.S.-
Kazakhstan BN-350 Spent Fuel Program.” 
125. “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Key 
Multilateral Workshops and Exercises.”
126. Nursultan Nazarbaev, “Global World and Nuclear 
Security,” European Dialogue, http://www.eurodialogue.org/
Global-World-and-Nuclear-Security.
127. “NNSA Secures 775 Nuclear Weapons Worth of 
Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material from BN-350 Fast Reactor 
in Kazakhstan,” NNSA, November 18, 2010, http://nnsa.
energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/bn35011.18.10. 
128. Ibid.
129. “Parliament: Strategic trade bill is passed,” The Star 
Online, April 5, 2010, http://thestar.com.my/news/story.
asp?ﬁ le=/2010/4/5/nation/20100405172919&sec=nation. 
130. “Trilateral Announcement Between Mexico, the United 
States, and Canada on Nuclear Security.”
131. “GFMR 2010,” p. 142.
132. Pomper and Potter, “Medical isotope production: The 
US must follow South Africa’s lead.” 
133. Norris and Kristensen, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons 
in Europe, 2011,” p. 69.
134. Personal communications with White House staff, 
April 2011.
135. “Details of Assistance Being Provided to NSOI-Developed 
Projects: New Zealand.”
136. The IAEA’s Nuclear Security Report noted a contribution 
from Norway between July 2009 and June 2010. In addition, 
in Norway’s statement to the 54th IAEA General Conference, 
it stated that “Today, we have formalized a commitment to 
allocate 2.5 million Euros over four years in an agreement 
with the Agency.” See Statement of Norway to the 54th 
General Conference of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, p. 4, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC54/
Statements/norway.pdf. 
137. “Norway Increases Support of NNSA Work to Combat 
Nuclear Smuggling.”
138. Karen DeYoung, “Pakistan doubles its nuclear arsenal,” 
The Washington Post, January 31, 2011, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/30/
AR2011013004682.html.
139. “GFMR 2010,” p. 130.
140. “Highly Enriched Uranium: Who Has What?,” Nuclear 
Threat Initiative, April 22, 2010, http://www.nti.org/db/heu/
Heu_Who_Has_What.pdf.
141. See, for example: Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 
2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials in Four Years (Cambridge, 
MA and Washington, DC: Harvard University and Nuclear 
Threat Initiative, 2010), p. 30.
142. Kenneth N. Luongo and Naeem Salik, “Building 
Conﬁ dence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” Arms Control 
Today 37 (December 2007), p. 11-17.
143. “NNSA Completes Largest Highly Enriched Uranium 
(HEU) Fuel Return Campaign in Program’s History.”
144. Ibid.
145. Pomper and Potter, “Medical isotope production: The 
US must follow South Africa’s lead.”
146. “Joint Co-Chair Statement Regarding the 2010 Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Plenary Meeting.”
147. “South Korea seeks to boost reactor exports,” World 
Nuclear News, January 13, 2010, http://www.world-nuclear-
news.org/NP-South_Korea_seeks_to_boost_reactor_exports-
1301104.html. 
148. “Clinton, Russia’s Lavrov Sign Plutonium 
Disposition Protocol,” America.gov, April 13, 2010, 
http://www.america.gov/st/nonprolif-english/2010/April/
20100413172713xjsnommis0.9075238.html.
149. “Russia closes last weapons-grade plutonium plant,” 
BBC News, April 15, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/8622631.stm.
150. “Russian Federation Supports IAEA Nuclear Security 
Fund,” International Atomic Energy Agency, December 7, 
2010, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2010/nsf.html.
151. Securing the Bomb 2010, p. 31
152. Government Accountability Ofﬁ ce, “Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better 
Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear 
Materials Worldwide,” December 2010.
153. “Outreach Events,” 1540 Committee, http://www.
un.org/sc/1540/outreachevents.shtml.
154. “GFMR 2010,” p. 136.
155. “First LEU-Produced Molybdenum-99 Approved 
for Patient Use Arrives in U.S.,” NNSA, December 6, 
2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/
leumoly120610.
156. “Appendix 8A: Global stocks of ﬁ ssile materials, 2009,” 
in SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
p. 369. 
157. “NNSA Announces Highly Enriched Uranium Removed 
from Turkey.”
158. Norris and Kristensen, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons 
in Europe, 2011,” p. 69.
159. GAO, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. 
Planning and Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure 
Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide,” p. 27.
160. “NNSA Achieves Milestone in Removal of HEU from 
Ukraine.”
161. “U.S. and United Arab Emirates Sign Megaports 
Initiative Agreement Aimed at Preventing Nuclear 
Smuggling.”
162. “UK Signs Agreement to Contribute to IAEA Nuclear 
Security Fund.” 
163. “PM invites IAEA ofﬁ cials to Sellaﬁ eld,” Sellaﬁ eld Ltd, 
March 23, 2010, http://www.sellaﬁ eldsites.com/news/2010-
03-23/pm-invites-iaea-ofﬁ cials-to-sellaﬁ eld.
164. “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic 
Defence and Security Review,” Her Majesty’s Government, 
October 2010, p. 38-39, http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_
consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/
digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=sdsr.
165. “GFMR 2010,” p. 71.
166. Ibid.
167. The White House did not list the United States as 
having made any national commitments in its highlights 
document. However, the United States did make a number 
of commitments in its national statement at the 2010 
NSS, which are listed here. The U.S. national statement is 
available at: “Nuclear Security Summit National Statement of 
the United States,” The White House, April 13, 2010, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁ ce/nuclear-security-
summit-national-statement-united-states.
168. “Nuclear Security Report 2010.”
169. “Clinton, Russia’s Lavrov Sign Plutonium Disposition 
Protocol.”
170. “Nuclear Security Summit National Statement of the 
United States.”
171. “FY 2012 Budget in Brief,” Department of Homeland 
Security, p. 82, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-
bib-fy2012.pdf. 
172. “Fact Sheet on U.S.-Japan Cooperation on Reducing 
Nuclear Risks.”
173. According to WINS’ 2010 annual report, the U.S. 
Department of Energy was the largest contributor to WINS 
in the year 2010. See: “Annual Report 2010: Sharing the 
Knowledge,” The World Institute for Nuclear Security, March 
2011, http://www.wins.org/content.aspx?id=119.
174. For ﬁ scal year 2011, see “Executive Budget Summary: 
Function 150 & Other International Programs, Fiscal Year 
2011,” Department of State, p. 82, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/135888.pdf. For ﬁ scal year 2012, 
see “Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 & Other 
International Programs, Fiscal Year 2012,” Department 
of State,” p. 105, http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/156214.pdf. 
175. “Department of Energy FY 2012 Congressional Budget 
Request: National Nuclear Security Administration,” 
February 2011, Department of Energy, p. 424, http://nnsa.
energy.gov/sites/default/ﬁ les/nnsa/inlineﬁ les/FY%202012%2
0NNSA%20Congressional%20Budget%20Submission_0.pdf.
176. E-mail from NNSA spokesman, February 15, 2011.
177. “Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons 
Stockpile,” Department of Defense, May 3, 2010, http://
www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_fact_sheet_us_nuclear_
transparency__ﬁ nal_w_date.pdf.
178. “GFMR 2010,” p. 34.
179. Ibid, p. 37.
180. Ibid, p. 34.
181. “U.S. and Vietnam Cooperate on Nuclear Non-
Proliferation in Dalat.”
182. “First LEU-Produced Molybdenum-99 Approved 
for Patient Use Arrives in the U.S.,” NNSA Press Release, 
December 6, 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/
pressreleases/leumoly120610.
35
A
rm
s 
Co
nt
ro
l A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
an
d 
Pa
rt
ne
rs
hi
p 
fo
r G
lo
ba
l S
ec
ur
ity
The 2010 N
uclear Security Sum
m
it: A
 Status U
pdate
36
The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a national nonpartisan membership 
organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. 
Through its public education and media programs and its magazine, Arms Control Today (ACT), ACA provides 
policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary 
on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues. In addition to 
the regular press briefings ACA holds on major arms control developments, the Association’s staff provides 
commentary and analysis on a broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States 
and abroad.
The Partnership for Global Security (PGS) analyzes the convergence of the security, technological, 
and economic issues that are shaping the 21st century’s global nuclear and biological challenges. Its focus is on 
creating the broad and integrated networks of private and public partnerships that are necessary to strengthen 
international security and ﬁ ght transnational threats. Its global reputation and reach, focus on key emerging 
global security challenges and trends, and development of actionable policy initiatives and recommendations 
have resulted in the creation of new international security programs and increased by millions of dollars the 
funding for important global security initiatives.
Arms Control Association
1313 L Street, NW Suite 130
Washington, D.C. 20005
www.armscontrol.org
Partnership for Global Security
1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 506
Washington, DC 20036
www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org
